The 9/11 Commission
Report
From Chapter
1, sections 1.1 and 1.2
These sections of chapter one detail the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11 as it left Logan Airport in Boston for Los Angeles until it crashed into the North Tower of The World Trade Center at 8:46 AM, and the homeland defense reaction to the hijacking. [note: where possible, recordings of the actual aircraft/air traffic control transmissions have been inserted in the appropriate places]
From Chapter 1, Section
1:
The Hijacking of American 11
American Airlines Flight 11 provided nonstop service from
Boston to Los Angeles. On September 11, Captain John Ogonowski
and First Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted the Boeing 767.
It carried its full capacity of nine flight attendants.
Eighty-one passengers boarded the flight with them (including
the five terrorists).
The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed
to 26,000 feet, not quite its initial assigned cruising
altitude of 29,000 feet. All communications and flight profile
data were normal. About this time the Fasten Seatbelt
sign would usually have been turned off and the flight attendants
would have begun
preparing for cabin service.
At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication
with the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions
from the FAAs air traffic control (ATC) center in
Boston. Sixteen seconds after that transmission, ATC instructed
the aircrafts pilots to climb to 35,000 feet. That
message and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight
were not acknowledged. From this and other evidence, we
believe the hijacking began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter.
Reports from two flight attendants in the coach cabin, Betty
Ong and Madeline Amy Sweeney, tell us most of
what we know about how the hijacking happened. As it began,
some of the hijackersmost likely Wail al Shehri and
Waleed al Shehri,who were seated in row 2 in first classstabbed
the two unarmed flight attendants who would have been preparing
for cabin service.
We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to
the cockpit; FAA rules required that the doors remain closed
and locked during flight. Ong speculated that they had jammed
their way in. Perhaps the terrorists stabbed the flight
attendants to get a cockpit key, to force one of them to
open the cockpit door, or to lure the captain or first officer
out of the cockpit. Or the flight attendants may just have
been in their way.
At the same time or shortly thereafter, Attathe only
terrorist on board trained to fly a jetwould have
moved to the cockpit from his business-class seat, possibly
accompanied by Omari.As this was happening, passenger Daniel
Lewin, who was seated in the row just behind Atta and Omari,was
stabbed by one of the hijackersprobably Satam al Suqami,
who was seated directly behind Lewin. Lewin had served four
years as an officer in the Israeli military. He may have
made an attempt to stop the hijackers in front of him, not
realizing that another was sitting behind him.
The hijackers quickly gained control and sprayed Mace, pepper
spray, or some other irritant in the first-class cabin,
in order to force the passengers and flight attendants toward
the rear of the plane.They claimed they had a bomb.
About five minutes after the hijacking began, Betty Ong
contacted the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations
Office in Cary, North Carolina, via an AT&T airphone
to report an emergency aboard the flight. This was the first
of several occasions on 9/11 when flight attendants took
action outside the scope of their training, which emphasized
that in a hijacking, they were to communicate with the cockpit
crew. The emergency call lasted approximately 25 minutes,
as Ong calmly and professionally relayed information about
events taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on
the ground.
At 8:19, Ong reported: The cockpit is not answering,
somebodys stabbed in business classand I think
theres Macethat we cant breatheI
dont know, I think were getting hijacked.
She then told of the stabbings of the two flight attendants.
At 8:21, one of the American employees receiving Ongs
call in North Carolina, Nydia Gonzalez, alerted the American
Airlines operations center in Fort Worth,Texas, reaching
Craig Marquis, the manager on duty. Marquis soon realized
this was an emergency and instructed the airlines
dispatcher responsible for the flight to contact the cockpit.
At 8:23, the dispatcher tried unsuccessfully to contact
the aircraft. Six minutes later, the air traffic control
specialist in Americans operations center contacted
the FAAs Boston Air Traffic Control Center about the
flight. The center was already aware of the problem.
Boston Center knew of a problem on the flight in part because
just before 8:25 the hijackers had attempted to communicate
with the passengers. The microphone was keyed, and immediately
one of the hijackers said, Nobody move. Everything
will be okay. If you try to make any moves, youll
endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.
Air traffic controllers heard the transmission; Ong did
not. The hijackers probably did not know how to operate
the cockpit radio communication system correctly, and thus
inadvertently broadcast their message over the air traffic
control channel instead of the cabin
public-address channel.
Also at 8:25, and again at 8:29, Amy Sweeney got through
to the American Flight Services Office in Boston but was
cut off after she reported someone was hurt aboard the flight.
Three minutes later, Sweeney was reconnected to the office
and began relaying updates to the manager, Michael Woodward.
At 8:26, Ong reported that the plane was flying erratically.
A minute later, Flight 11 turned south. American also began
getting identifications of the hijackers, as Ong and then
Sweeney passed on some of the seat numbers of those who
had gained unauthorized access to the cockpit.
Sweeney calmly reported on her line that the plane had been
hijacked; a man in first class had his throat slashed; two
flight attendants had been stabbedone was seriously
hurt and was on oxygen while the others wounds seemed
minor; a doctor had been requested; the flight attendants
were unable to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb
in the cockpit. Sweeney told Woodward that she and Ong were
trying to relay as much information as they could to people
on the ground.
At 8:38, Ong told Gonzalez that the plane was flying erratically
again. Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers
were Middle Easterners, naming three of their seat numbers.
One spoke very little English and one spoke excellent English.
The hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit, and she did
not know how. The aircraft was in a rapid descent.
At 8:41, Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach
were under the impression that there was a routine medical
emergency in first class. Other flight attendants were busy
at duties such as getting medical supplies while Ong and
Sweeney were reporting the events.
At 8:41, in Americans operations center, a colleague
told Marquis that the air traffic controllers declared Flight
11 a hijacking and think hes [American 11] headed
toward Kennedy [airport in New York City]. Theyre
moving everybody out of the way. They seem to have him on
a primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending.
At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong.
About this same time Sweeney reported to Woodward, Something
is wrong. We are in a rapid descent . . .we are all over
the place. Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the
window to see if she could determine where they were. Sweeney
responded: We are flying low. We are flying very,
very low. We are flying way too low. Seconds later
she said, Oh my God we are way too low. The
phone call ended.
At 8:46:40, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of
the World Trade Center in New York City. All on board, along
with an unknown number of people in the tower, were killed
instantly.
From Chapter 1, Section 2:
American Airlines Flight 11
FAA Awareness. Although the Boston Center air traffic controller
realized at an early stage that there was something wrong
with American 11, he did not immediately interpret the planes
failure to respond as a sign that it had been hijacked.
At 8:14, when the flight failed to heed his instruction
to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried
to raise the flight. He reached out to the pilot on the
emergency frequency. Though there was no response, he kept
trying to contact the aircraft.
At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately
degrading the information available about the aircraft.
The controller told his supervisor that he thought something
was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected
a hijacking. The supervisor instructed the controller to
follow standard procedures for handling a no radio
aircraft. The controller checked to see if American Airlines
could establish communication with American 11. He became
even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another
sectors airspace. Controllers immediately began to
move aircraft out of its path, and asked other aircraft
in the vicinity to look for American 11.
At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American
11:
American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and youll
be okay. We are returning to the airport.
The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did
not hear the specific words we have some planes.
The next transmission came seconds later:
American 11: Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you
try to make any moves, youll endanger yourself and
the airplane. Just stay quiet.
The controller told us that he then knew it was a hijacking.
He alerted his supervisor, who assigned another controller
to assist him. He redoubled his efforts to ascertain the
flights altitude. Because the controller didnt
understand the initial transmission, the manager of Boston
Center instructed his quality assurance specialist to pull
the tape of the radio transmission, listen to it closely,
and report back.
Between 8:25 and 8:32, in accordance with the FAA protocol,
Boston Center managers started notifying their chain of
command that American 11 had been hijacked. At 8:28, Boston
Center called the Command Center in Herndon to advise that
it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading
toward
New York Centers airspace.
By this time, American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the
south. At 8:32, the Command Center passed word of a possible
hijacking to the Operations Center at FAA headquarters.
The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters
had just begun discussing the apparent hijack on a conference
call with the New England regional office. FAA headquarters
began to follow the hijack protocol but did not contact
the NMCC to request a fighter escort.
The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconference
between Boston, New York, and Cleveland Centers so that
Boston Center could help the others understand what was
happening.
At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received a third transmission
from American 11:
American 11: Nobody move please. We are going back to the
airport. Dont try to make any stupid moves.
In the succeeding minutes, controllers were attempting to
ascertain the altitude of the southbound flight.
Military Notification and Response. Boston Center
did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance
through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to
notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative,
at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAAs
Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former
alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased
out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the
first notification received by the militaryat any
levelthat American 11 had been hijacked:
FAA: Hi. Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we
have a problem here.We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards
New York, and we need you guys to,we need someone to scramble
some F-16s
or something up there, help us out.
NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise?
FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test.
NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft
at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles
away from New York City. The air defense of America began
with this call.
At NEADS, the report of the hijacking was relayed immediately
to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr. After ordering
the Otis fighters to battle stations, Colonel Marr phoned
Major General Larry Arnold, commanding general of the First
Air Force and NORADs Continental Region. Marr sought
authorization to scramble the Otis fighters. General Arnold
later recalled instructing Marr to go ahead and scramble
them, and well get authorities later. General
Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report.
F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force
Base. But NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter
aircraft, and the officer directing the fighters pressed
for more information: I dont know where Im
scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination.
Because the hijackers had turned off the planes transponder,
NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar
scopes for the primary radar return. American 11 struck
the North Tower at 8:46. Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS
personnel were still trying to locate the flight, word reached
them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center.
Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53.
Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military-controlled
airspace off the Long Island coast. To avoid New York area
air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters
were brought down to military airspace to hold as
needed. From 9:09
to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.
In summary, NEADS received notice of the hijacking nine
minutes before it struck the North Tower. That nine minutes
notice before impact was the most the military would receive
of any of the four hijackings.