The 9/11 Commission
Report
From Chapter
1, sections 1.1 and 1.2
These sections of chapter
one detail the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77 as it left Washington Dulles Airport for Los Angeles until
it crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 AM, and the homeland
defense reaction to the hijacking. [note: where possible,
recordings of the actual aircraft/air traffic control transmissions
have been inserted in the appropriate places]
From Chapter 1, Section 1:
The Hijacking of American 77
American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington
Dulles for Los Angeles at 8:10. The aircraft was a Boeing
757 piloted by Captain Charles F. Burlingame and First Officer
David Charlebois. There were four flight attendants. On September
11, the flight carried 58 passengers.
American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off
at 8:20. At 8:46, the flight reached its assigned cruising
altitude of 35,000 feet. Cabin service would have begun. At
8:51, American 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication.
The hijacking began between 8:51 and 8:54. As on American
11 and United 175, the hijackers used knives (reported by
one passenger) and moved all the passengers (and possibly
crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported by one flight
attendant and one passenger). Unlike the earlier flights,
the Flight 77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have
box cutters. Finally, a passenger
reported that an announcement had been made by the “pilot”
that the plane had been hijacked. Neither of the firsthand
accounts mentioned any stabbings or the threat or use of either
a bomb or Mace, though both witnesses began the flight in
the first-class cabin.
At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning
south. Two minutes later the transponder was turned off and
even primary radar contact with the aircraft was lost. The
Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center repeatedly tried and
failed to contact the aircraft. American Airlines dispatchers
also tried, without success.
At 9:00, American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard
Arpey learned that communications had been lost with American
77. This was now the second American aircraft in trouble.
He ordered all American Airlines flights in the Northeast
that had not taken off to remain on the ground. Shortly before
9:10, suspecting that American 77 had been hijacked, American
headquarters concluded that the second aircraft to hit the
World Trade Center might have been Flight 77. After learning
that United Airlines was missing a plane, American Airlines
headquarters extended the ground stop nationwide.
At 9:12, Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las Vegas.
She said her flight was being hijacked by six individuals
who had moved them to the rear of the plane. She asked her
mother to alert American Airlines. Nancy May and her husband
promptly did so.
At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called
her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United
States. She reported that the flight had been hijacked, and
the hijackers had knives and box cutters. She further indicated
that the hijackers were not aware of her phone call, and that
they had put all the passengers in the back of the plane.
About a minute into the conversation, the call was cut off.
Solicitor General Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney
General John Ashcroft.
Shortly after the first call, Barbara Olson reached her husband
again. She reported that the pilot had announced that the
flight had been hijacked, and she asked her husband what she
should tell the captain to do.Ted Olson asked for her location
and she replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses.
Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast.
The Solicitor General then informed his wife of the two previous
hijackings and crashes. She did not display signs of panic
and did not indicate any awareness of an impending crash.
At that point, the second call was cut off.
At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the
aircraft was at 7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west
of the Pentagon. At 9:32, controllers at the Dulles Terminal
Radar Approach Control “observed a primary radar target
tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed.” This was
later determined to have been Flight 77.
At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised
the Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction
of the White House. American 77 was then 5 miles west-southwest
of the Pentagon and began a 330-degree turn. At the end of
the turn, it was descending through 2,200 feet, pointed toward
the Pentagon and downtown Washington. The hijacker pilot then
advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove toward the
Pentagon.
At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon,
traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour. All on board,
as well as many civilian and military personnel in the building,
were killed.
From Chapter 1, Section 2:
American Airlines Flight 77
FAA Awareness. American 77 began deviating from its flight
plan at 8:54, with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes
later, it disappeared completely from radar at Indianapolis
Center, which was controlling the flight.
The controller tracking American 77 told us he noticed the
aircraft turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear.
The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched
along the plane’s projected flight path and the airspace
to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary
targets
appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft
directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing. At this
point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the
situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft
had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced
serious electrical or mechanical failure, or both, and was
gone.
Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying
other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly
crashed. At 9:08, Indianapolis Center asked Air Force Search
and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look for a downed
aircraft. The center also contacted the West Virginia State
Police and
asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received.
At 9:09, it reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional
center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters
at 9:24.
By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other
hijacked aircraft, and began to doubt its initial assumption
that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern
between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Center
in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities
that
American 77 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA
field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search
for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked. At 9:25,
the Command Center advised FAA headquarters of the situation.
The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77
led us to investigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions
performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked
the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off
at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and
9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not
displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. The reasons
are technical, arising from the way the software processed
radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage
where American 77 was flying.
According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 reemerged
as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at
9:05, east of its last known position. The target remained
in Indianapolis Center’s airspace for another six minutes,
then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center’s
airspace at 9:10. As Indianapolis Center continued searching
for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible
for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the
flight’s projected path, not east—where the aircraft
was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers
at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage
to join in the search for American 77.
In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around.
By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers
had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought
it had crashed or were looking toward the west. Although the
Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor
FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding
centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled
undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for
Washington, D.C.
By 9:25, FAA’s Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters
knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center.
They knew American 77 was lost. At least some FAA officials
in Boston Center and the New England Region knew that a hijacker
on board American 11 had said “we have some planes.”
Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount.
A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters
if they wanted to order a “nationwide ground stop.”
While this was being discussed by executives at FAA headquarters,
the Command Center ordered one at 9:25.
The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21,
it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles
urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32,
they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers “observed
a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of
speed” and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel
at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret
Service. The aircraft’s identity or type was unknown.
Reagan National controllers then vectored an unarmed National
Guard C-130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route
to Minnesota, to identify and follow the suspicious aircraft.
The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757,
attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after impact,
reported to the control tower: “looks like that aircraft
crashed into the Pentagon sir.”
Military Notification and Response. NORAD heard nothing
about the search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders
heard renewed reports about a plane that no longer existed:
American 11.
At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA:
FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American
11 is still in the air, and it’s on its way towards—heading
towards Washington.
NEADS: Okay. American 11 is still in the air?
FAA:Yes.
NEADS: On its way towards Washington?
FAA: That was another—it was evidently another aircraft
that hit the tower. That’s the latest report we have.
NEADS: Okay.
FAA: I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I
would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey
or somewhere further south.
NEADS: Okay. So American 11 isn’t the hijack at all then,
right?
FAA: No, he is a hijack.
NEADS: He—American 11 is a hijack?
FAA: Yes.
NEADS: And he’s heading into Washington?
FAA: Yes.This could be a third aircraft.
The mention of a “third aircraft”was not a reference
to American 77. There was confusion at that moment in the
FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston
Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that
American 11 was still airborne. We have been unable to identify
the
source of this mistaken FAA information.
The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately
passed the word to the mission crew commander, who reported
to the NEADS battle commander:
Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: Okay, uh, American Airlines
is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading
towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley
right now.And I’m gonna
take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if
I can find him.
After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued
the order at 9:23: “Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head
them towards the Washington area. . . . [I]f they’re
there then we’ll run on them. . . .These guys are smart.”
That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force
Base at 9:24. Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne
at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New
York. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to
send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander
explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley
fighters between the reported southbound American 11 and the
nation’s capital.
At the suggestion of the Boston Center’s military liaison,
NEADS contacted the FAA’s Washington Center to ask about
American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington
Center manager informed NEADS: “We’re looking—we
also lost American 77.”
The time was 9:34. This was the first notice to the military
that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If
NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would
have received no information whatsoever that the flight was
even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it.
No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance
with American 77.
At 9:36, the FAA’s Boston Center called NEADS and relayed
the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on
Washington: “Latest report. Aircraft VFR [visual flight
rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six,
southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away.”
This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at
NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a
flight path for the Langley fighters: “Okay,we’re
going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the
White House.”
He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters
were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed,
but east over the ocean. “I don’t care how many
windows you break,” he said. “Damn it. . . . Okay.
Push them back.”
The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three
reasons. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order
did not include a distance to the target or the target’s
location. Second, a “generic” flight plan—prepared
to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly—incorrectly
led the Langley
fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090)
for 60 miles. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller
incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go “090
for 60” superseded the original scramble order.
After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft
a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were
ordered to Washington, D.C. Controllers at NEADS located an
unknown primary radar track, but “it kind of faded”
over Washington. The time was 9:38. The Pentagon had been
struck by American 77 at 9:37:46. The Langley fighters were
about 150 miles away.
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another
possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact
had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade
Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both
aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed
Logan Airport.
Remembering the “we have some planes” remark, Boston
Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston
Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767
jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible
hijack. NEADS warned the FAA’s Cleveland Center to watch
Delta 1989. The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched
it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple
erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American
11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter
aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight
never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that
the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it
reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed
in Cleveland. But another aircraft was heading toward Washington,
an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93.