The 9/11 Commission
Report
From Chapter
1, sections 1.1 and 1.2
These sections of chapter
one detail the hijacking of United Airlines Flight 93 as it left Newark, New Jersey for San Francisco until it crashed
into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 10:03 AM, and
the homeland defense reaction to the hijacking. [note: where
possible, recordings of the actual aircraft/air traffic control
transmissions have been inserted in the appropriate places]
From Chapter 1, Section 1:
The Battle for United 93
At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New
Jersey) Liberty International Airport bound for San Francisco.The
aircraft was piloted by Captain Jason Dahl and First Officer
Leroy Homer, and there were five flight attendants. Thirty-seven
passengers, including the hijackers, boarded the plane. Scheduled
to depart the gate at 8:00, the Boeing 757s takeoff
was delayed because of the airports typically heavy
morning traffic.
The hijackers had planned to take flights scheduled to depart
at 7:45 (American 11), 8:00 (United 175 and United 93), and
8:10 (American 77). Three of the flights had actually taken
off within 10 to 15 minutes of their planned departure times.
United 93 would ordinarily have taken off about 15 minutes
after pulling away from the gate. When it left the ground
at 8:42, the flight was running more than 25 minutes late.
As United 93 left Newark, the flights crew members were
unaware of the hijacking of American 11. Around 9:00, the
FAA, American, and United were facing the staggering realization
of apparent multiple hijackings. At 9:03, they would see another
aircraft strike the World Trade Center. Crisis managers at
the FAA and the airlines did not yet act to warn other aircraft.
At the same time, Boston Center realized that a message transmitted
just before 8:25 by the hijacker pilot of American 11 included
the phrase,We have some planes.
No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt
with multiple hijackings. Such a plot had not been carried
out anywhere in the world in more than 30 years, and never
in the United States. As news of the hijackings filtered through
the FAA and the airlines, it does not seem to have occurred
to their leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft
in the air that they too might be at risk.
United 175 was hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46, and awareness
of that hijacking began to spread after 8:51. American 77
was hijacked between 8:51 and 8:54. By 9:00, FAA and airline
officials began to comprehend that attackers were going after
multiple aircraft. American Airlines nationwide ground
stop between 9:05 and 9:10 was followed by a United Airlines
ground stop. FAA controllers at Boston Center, which had tracked
the first two hijackings, requested at 9:07 that Herndon Command
Center get messages to airborne aircraft to increase
security for the cockpit. There is no evidence that
Herndon took such action. Boston Center immediately began
speculating about other aircraft that might be in danger,
leading them to worry about a transcontinental flightDelta
1989that in fact was not hijacked. At 9:19, the FAAs
New England regional office called Herndon and asked that
Cleveland Center advise Delta 1989 to use extra cockpit security.
Several FAA air traffic control officials told us it was the
air carriers responsibility to notify their planes of
security problems. One senior FAA air traffic control manager
said that it was simply not the FAAs place to order
the airlines what to tell their pilots. We believe such statements
do not reflect an adequate appreciation of the FAAs
responsibility for the safety and security of civil aviation.
The airlines bore responsibility, too. They were facing an
escalating number of conflicting and, for the most part, erroneous
reports about other flights, as well as a continuing lack
of vital information from the FAA about the hijacked flights.
We found no evidence, however, that American Airlines sent
any cockpit warnings to its aircraft on 9/11. Uniteds
first decisive action to notify its airborne aircraft to take
defensive action did not come until 9:19, when a United flight
dispatcher, Ed Ballinger, took the initiative to begin transmitting
warnings to his 16 transcontinental flights: Beware
any cockpit intrusionTwo a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade
Center. One of the flights that received the warning
was United 93. Because Ballinger was still responsible for
his other flights as well as Flight 175, his warning message
was not transmitted to Flight 93 until 9:23.
By all accounts, the first 46 minutes of Flight 93s
cross-country trip proceeded routinely. Radio communications
from the plane were normal. Heading, speed, and altitude ran
according to plan. At 9:24, Ballingers warning to United
93 was received in the cockpit. Within two minutes, at 9:26,
the pilot, Jason Dahl, responded with a note of puzzlement:
Ed, confirm latest mssg plzJason.
The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet
above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven
seconds into the descent, the FAAs air traffic control
center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions
from the aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain
or first
officer could be heard declaring Mayday amid the
sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. The second radio
transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was
continuing. The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:
Hey get out of hereget out of hereget out
of here.
On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United
9333 in addition to the 4 hijackers. This was below
the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. But
there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger
levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation.
The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights
on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit
takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. On Flight 93, however,
the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there
were only four hijackers. The operative likely intended to
round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had
been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at
Floridas Orlando International Airport in August.
Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers
on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of
the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from
the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat
by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier
or FAA personnel. We have found no evidence indicating that
one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight.
All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they
seem to have used them. We believe it is more likely that
Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained
seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized;
and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.
At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to
make the following announcement to the passengers of Flight
93: Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit
down keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So,
sit. The flight data recorder (also recovered) indicates
that Jarrah then
instructed the planes autopilot to turn the aircraft
around and head east.
The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most
likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit.
She struggled with one of the hijackers who killed or otherwise
silenced her.
Shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a
series of calls from GTE airphones and cellular phones. These
calls between family, friends, and colleagues took place until
the end of the flight and provided those on the ground with
firsthand accounts. They enabled the passengers to gain critical
information, including the news that two aircraft had slammed
into the World Trade Center.
At 9:39, the FAAs Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control
Center overheard a second announcement indicating that there
was a bomb on board, that the plane was returning to the airport,
and that they should remain seated. While it apparently was
not heard by the passengers, this announcement, like those
on
Flight 11 and Flight 77, was intended to deceive them. Jarrah,
like Atta earlier, may have inadvertently broadcast the message
because he did not know how to operate the radio and the intercom.
To our knowledge none of them had ever flown an actual airliner
before.
At least two callers from the flight reported that the hijackers
knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem to
care. It is quite possible Jarrah knew of the success of the
assault on the World Trade Center. He could have learned of
this from messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits
of
its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93, warning
of cockpit intrusion and telling of the New York attacks.
But even without them, he would certainly have understood
that the attacks on the World Trade Center would already have
unfolded, given Flight 93s tardy departure from Newark.
If Jarrah did know that the passengers were making calls,
it might not have occurred to him that they were certain to
learn what had happened in New York, thereby defeating his
attempts at deception. At least ten passengers and two crew
members shared vital information with family, friends, colleagues,
or others on the ground. All understood the plane had been
hijacked. They said the hijackers wielded knives and claimed
to have a bomb. The hijackers were wearing red bandanas, and
they forced the passengers to the back of the aircraft.
Callers reported that a passenger had been stabbed and that
two people were lying on the floor of the cabin, injured or
deadpossibly the captain and first officer. One caller
reported that a flight attendant had been killed.
One of the callers from United 93 also reported that he thought
the hijackers might possess a gun. But none of the other callers
reported the presence of a firearm. One recipient of a call
from the aircraft recounted specifically asking her caller
whether the hijackers had guns. The passenger replied that
he did not see one. No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable
remains was found at the aircrafts crash site, and the
cockpit voice recorder gives no indication of a gun being
fired or mentioned at any time.We believe that if the hijackers
had possessed a gun, they would have used it in the flights
last minutes as the passengers fought back.
Passengers on three flights reported the hijackers claim
of having a bomb. The FBI told us they found no trace of explosives
at the crash sites. One of the passengers who mentioned a
bomb expressed his belief that it was not real. Lacking any
evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegal
items past the security screening checkpoints, we believe
the bombs were probably fake.
During at least five of the passengers phone calls,
information was shared about the attacks that had occurred
earlier that morning at the World Trade Center. Five calls
described the intent of passengers and surviving crew members
to revolt against the hijackers. According to one call, they
voted on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake
the plane. They decided, and acted.
At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had
terminated phone calls with loved ones in order to join the
revolt. One of the callers ended her message as follows: Everyones
running up to first class. Ive got to go. Bye.
The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger
assault
muffled by the intervening cockpit door. Some family members
who listened to the recording report that they can hear the
voice of a loved one among the din. We cannot identify whose
voices can be heard. But the assault was sustained.
In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane
to the left and right, attempting to knock the passengers
off balance. At 9:58:57, Jarrah told another hijacker in the
cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to roll the airplane
sharply left and right, but the assault continued. At 9:59:52,
Jarrah changed tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane
up and down to disrupt the assault. The recorder captured
the sounds of loud thumps, crashes, shouts, and breaking glasses
and plates. At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane.
Five seconds later, Jarrah asked, Is that it? Shall
we finish it off? A hijacker responded, No. Not
yet. When they all come, we finish it off. The sounds
of fighting continued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched
the nose of the aircraft up and down. At 10:00:26, a passenger
in the background said, In the
cockpit. If we dont well die! Sixteen seconds
later, a passenger yelled, Roll it! Jarrah stopped
the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said, Allah
is the greatest! Allah is the greatest! He then asked
another hijacker in the cockpit, Is that it? I mean,
shall we put it down? to which the other replied, Yes,
put it in it, and pull it down.
The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a
hijacker said, Pull it down! Pull it down! The
hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that
the passengers were only seconds from overcoming them. The
airplane headed down; the control wheel was turned hard to
the right. The airplane
rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers began shouting
Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest.
With the sounds of the passenger counterattack continuing,
the aircraft plowed into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania,
at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes flying time
from Washington, D.C.
Jarrahs objective was to crash his airliner into symbols
of the American Republic, the Capitol or the White House.
He was defeated by the alerted, unarmed passengers of United
93.
From Chapter 1, Section 2:
United Airlines Flight 93
FAA Awareness. At 9:27, after having been in the air for
45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the
Cleveland Center controller. This was the last normal contact
the FAA had with the flight.
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the
pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard a radio transmission
of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle
from an unknown origin.
The controller responded, seconds later: Somebody call
Cleveland? This was followed by a second radio transmission,
with sounds of screaming. The Cleveland Center controllers
began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions,
and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet. The
controller attempted again to raise United 93 several times,
with no response.
At 9:30, the controller began to poll the other flights on
his frequency to determine if they had heard the screaming;
several said they had.
At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency:
Keep remaining sitting.We have a bomb on board.
The controller understood, but chose to respond: Calling
Cleveland Center, youre unreadable. Say again, slowly.
He notified his supervisor, who passed the notice up the chain
of command. By 9:34,word of the hijacking had reached FAA
headquarters.
FAA headquarters had by this time established an open line
of communication with the Command Center at Herndon and instructed
it to poll all its centers about suspect aircraft. The Command
Center executed the request and, a minute later, Cleveland
Center reported that United 93 may have a bomb on board.
At 9:34, the Command Center relayed the information concerning
United 93 to FAA headquarters. At approximately 9:36, Cleveland
advised the Command Center that it was still tracking United
93 and specifically inquired whether someone had requested
the military to launch fighter aircraft to intercept
the aircraft. Cleveland even told the Command Center it was
prepared to contact a nearby military base to make the request.
The Command Center told Cleveland that FAA personnel well
above them in the chain of command had to make the decision
to seek military assistance and were working on the issue.
Between 9:34 and 9:38, the Cleveland controller observed United
93 climbing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft
out its way. The controller continued to try to contact United
93, and asked whether the pilot could confirm that he had
been hijacked. There was no response.
Then, at 9:39, a fourth radio transmission was heard from
United 93:
Ziad Jarrah: Uh, this is the captain. Would like you all to
remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back
to the airport, and to have our demands [unintelligible].
Please remain quiet.
The controller responded: United 93, understand you
have a bomb on board. Go ahead. The flight did not respond.
From 9:34 to 10:08, a Command Center facility manager provided
frequent updates to Acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger
and other executives at FAA headquarters as United 93 headed
toward Washington, D.C. At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United
93s transponder signal. The controller located
it on primary radar, matched its position with visual sightings
from other aircraft, and tracked the flight as it turned east,
then south.
At 9:42, the Command Center learned from news reports that
a plane had struck the Pentagon. The Command Centers
national operations manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities
to instruct all aircraft to land at the nearest airport. This
was an unprecedented order. The air traffic control system
handled it with great skill, as about 4,500 commercial and
general aviation aircraft soon landed without incident.
At 9:46 the Command Center updated FAA headquarters that United
93 was now twenty-nine minutes out of Washington, D.C.
At 9:49, 13 minutes after Cleveland Center had asked about
getting military help,the Command Center suggested that someone
at headquarters should decide whether to request military
assistance:
FAA Headquarters: Theyre pulling Jeff away to go talk
about United 93.
Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling
aircraft?
FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I dont know.
Command Center: Uh, thats a decision somebodys
gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes.
FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.
At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed the Command Center that
the deputy director for air traffic services was talking to
Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft. Then the Command Center
informed headquarters that controllers had lost track of United
93 over the Pittsburgh area.Within seconds, the Command Center
received a visual report from another aircraft, and informed
headquarters that the aircraft was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown.
United 93 was spotted by another aircraft, and, at 10:01,
the Command Center advised FAA headquarters that one of the
aircraft had seen United 93 waving his wings.
The aircraft had witnessed the hijackers efforts to
defeat the passengers counterattack.
United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03:11, 125 miles from
Washington, D.C. The precise crash time has been the subject
of some dispute. The 10:03:11 impact time is supported by
previous National Transportation Safety Board analysis and
by evidence from the Commission staff s analysis of
radar, the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder,
infrared satellite data, and air traffic control transmissions.
Five minutes later, the Command Center forwarded this update
to headquarters:
Command Center: O.K. Uh, there is now on that United 93.
FAA Headquarters: Yes.
Command Center: There is a report of black smoke in the last
position I gave you, fifteen miles south of Johnstown.
FAA Headquarters: From the airplane or from the ground?
Command Center: Uh, theyre speculating its from
the aircraft.
FAA Headquarters: Okay.
Command Center: Uh, who, it hit the ground. Thats what
theyre speculating, thats speculation only.
The aircraft that spotted the black smoke was
the same unarmed Air National Guard cargo plane that had seen
American 77 crash into the Pentagon 27 minutes earlier. It
had resumed its flight to Minnesota and saw the smoke from
the crash of United 93, less than two minutes after the plane
went down. At 10:17, the Command Center advised headquarters
of its conclusion that United 93 had indeed crashed.
Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one
from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding
United 93. Nor did any manager at FAA headquarters pass any
of the information it had about United 93 to the military.
Military Notification and Response. NEADS first received
a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland
Center at 10:07. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed,
Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircrafts last known latitude
and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on
radar because it was already in the ground.
At the same time, the NEADS mission crew commander was dealing
with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington,
D.C., sorting out what their orders were with respect to potential
targets. Shortly after 10:10, and having no knowledge either
that United 93 had been heading toward Washington or that
it had crashed, he explicitly instructed the Langley fighters:
negativenegative clearance to shoot aircraft
over the nations capital.
The news of a reported bomb on board United 93 spread quickly
at NEADS. The air defenders searched for United 93s
primary radar return and tried to locate other fighters to
scramble. NEADS called Washington Center to report:
NEADS: I also want to give you a heads-up,Washington.
FAA (DC): Go ahead.
NEADS: United nine three, have you got information on that
yet?
FAA: Yeah, hes down.
NEADS: Hes down?
FAA: Yes.
NEADS: When did he land? Cause we have got confirmation
FAA: He did not land.
NEADS: Oh, hes down? Down?
FAA: Yes. Somewhere up northeast of Camp David.
NEADS: Northeast of Camp David.
FAA: Thats the last report. They dont know exactly
where.
The time of notification of the crash of United 93 was 10:15.
The NEADS air defenders never located the flight or followed
it on their radar scopes. The flight had already crashed by
the time they learned it was hijacked.
Clarifying the Record
The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in
accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised
by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that
attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the
transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass
destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had
nine minutes notice on the first hijacked plane, no
advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third,
and no advance notice on the fourth.
We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects
discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities.
NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information,
and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what
they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers,
and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommending
a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and,
ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing
that unprecedented order flawlessly.
More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts
of those events made it appear that the military was notified
in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions
about the adequacy of the response. Those accounts had the
effect of deflecting questions about the militarys capacity
to obtain
timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition,
they overstated the FAAs ability to provide the military
with timely and useful information that morning.
In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD
officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification
of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There
was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding
normally at that time.
In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that
at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American
77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received
at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center
and was heading for Washington, D.C.
In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials
also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond
to the notifications about American 77, 178 United 93, or
both. These statements were incorrect as well. The fighters
were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was
heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations
at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers;
contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region
headquarters, and NORAD; and other records. Yet this response
to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public
timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense.
The inaccurate accounts created the impression that the Langley
scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft.
In fact, not only was the scramble prompted by the mistaken
information about American 11, but NEADS never received notice
that American 77 was hijacked. It was notified at 9:34 that
American 77 was lost. Then, minutes later, NEADS was told
that an unknown plane was 6 miles southwest of the White House.
Only then did the already scrambled airplanes start moving
directly toward Washington, D.C.
Thus the military did not have 14 minutes to respond to American
77, as testimony to the Commission in May 2003 suggested.
It had at most one or two minutes to react to the unidentified
plane approaching Washington, and the fighters were in the
wrong place to be able to help. They had been responding to
a report about an aircraft that did not exist.
Nor did the military have 47 minutes to respond to United
93, as would be implied by the account that it received notice
of the flights hijacking at 9:16. By the time the military
learned about the flight, it had crashed.