The 9/11 Commission
Report
September 11,
2001
Chapter 1, section 1.3
Section 3 of chapter
1 details the Bush Administrations National Crisis Management
of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
1.3 NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT
When American 11 struck the World Trade Center at 8:46, no
one in the White House or traveling with the President knew
that it had been hijacked. While that information circulated
within the FAA, we found no evidence that the hijacking was
reported to any other agency in Washington before 8:46.
Most federal agencies learned about the crash in New York
from CNN. Within the FAA,the administrator, Jane Garvey, and
her acting deputy, Monte Belger, had not been told of a confirmed
hijacking before they learned from television that a plane
had crashed. Others in the agency were aware of it, as we
explained earlier in this chapter.
Inside the National Military Command Center, the deputy director
of operations and his assistant began notifying senior Pentagon
officials of the incident. At about 9:00, the senior NMCC
operations officer reached out to the FAA operations center
for information. Although the NMCC was advised of the hijacking
of American 11, the scrambling of jets was not discussed.
In Sarasota, Florida, the presidential motorcade was arriving
at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School, where President Bush
was to read to a class and talk about education.White House
Chief of Staff Andrew Card told us he was standing with the
President outside the classroom when Senior Advisor to the
President Karl Rove first informed them that a small, twin-engine
plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. The Presidents
reaction was that the incident must have been caused by pilot
error.
At 8:55, before entering the classroom, the President spoke
to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who was at
the White House. She recalled first telling the President
it was a twin-engine aircraftand then a commercial aircraftthat
had struck the World Trade Center, adding thats
all we know right now, Mr. President.
At the White House, Vice President Dick Cheney had just sat
down for a meeting when his assistant told him to turn on
his television because a plane had struck the North Tower
of the World Trade Center. The Vice President was wondering
how the hell could a plane hit the World Trade Center
when he saw the second aircraft strike the South Tower.
Elsewhere in the White House, a series of 9:00 meetings was
about to begin. In the absence of information that the crash
was anything other than an accident, the White House staff
monitored the news as they went ahead with their regular schedules.
The Agencies Confer
When they learned a second plane had struck the World Trade
Center, nearly everyone in the White House told us, they immediately
knew it was not an accident. The Secret Service initiated
a number of security enhancements around the White House complex.
The officials who issued these orders did not know that there
were additional hijacked aircraft, or that one such aircraft
was en route to Washington. These measures were precautionary
steps taken because of the strikes in New York.
The FAA and White House Teleconferences. The FAA,the
White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency
teleconference before 9:30. Because none of these teleconferencesat
least before 10:00included the right officials from
both the FAA and Defense Department, none succeeded in meaningfully
coordinating the military and FAA response to the hijackings.
At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set
up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including
the Defense Department. The NMCC officer who participated
told us that the call was monitored only periodically because
the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and
there were other important tasks. The FAA manager of the teleconference
also remembered that the military participated only briefly
before the Pentagon was hit. Both individuals agreed that
the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response
to the attacks of 9/11. Acting Deputy Administrator Belger
was frustrated to learn later in the morning that the military
had not been on the call.
At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted
from the Situation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant
to the president long involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate
that it began at 9:25 and included the CIA; the FBI; the departments
of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and the White House
shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40. The first topic addressed
in the White House video teleconferenceat about 9:40was
the physical security of the President, the White House, and
federal agencies. Immediately thereafter it was reported that
a plane had hit the Pentagon. We found no evidence that video
teleconference participants had any prior information that
American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward
Washington. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the video teleconference
was fully
under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck.
Garvey, Belger, and other senior officials from FAA headquarters
participated in this video teleconference at various times.
We do not know who from Defense participated, but we know
that in the first hour none of the personnel involved in managing
the crisis did. And none of the information conveyed in the
White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour,
was being passed to the NMCC. As one witness recalled, [It]
was almost like there were parallel decisionmaking processes
going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated by the NMCC
. . . and then there was the [White House video teleconference].
. . .[I]n my mind they were competing venues for command and
control and decisionmaking.
At 10:03, the conference received reports of more missing
aircraft, 2 possibly 3 aloft, and learned of a
combat air patrol over Washington. There was discussion of
the need for rules of engagement. Clarke reported that they
were asking the President for authority to shoot down aircraft.
Confirmation of that
authority came at 10:25, but the commands were already being
conveyed in more direct contacts with the Pentagon.
The Pentagon Teleconferences. Inside the National Military
Command Center, the deputy director for operations immediately
thought the second strike was a terrorist attack. The job
of the NMCC in such an emergency is to gather the relevant
parties and establish the chain of command between the National
Command Authoritythe president and the secretary of
defenseand those who need to carry out their orders.
On the morning of September 11, Secretary Rumsfeld was having
breakfast at the Pentagon with a group of members of Congress.
He then returned to his office for his daily intelligence
briefing. The Secretary was informed of the second strike
in New York during the briefing; he resumed the briefing while
awaiting more information. After the Pentagon was struck,
Secretary Rumsfeld went to the parking lot to assist with
rescue efforts.
Inside the NMCC, the deputy director for operations called
for an all-purpose significant event conference.
It began at 9:29, with a brief recap: two aircraft had struck
the World Trade Center, there was a confirmed hijacking of
American 11, and Otis fighters had been scrambled.The FAA
was asked to provide an update, but the line was silent because
the FAA had not been added to the call.A minute later, the
deputy director stated that it had just been confirmed that
American 11 was still airborne and heading toward D.C. He
directed the transition to an air threat conference call.
NORAD confirmed that American
11 was airborne and heading toward Washington, relaying the
erroneous FAA information already mentioned. The call then
ended, at about 9:34.
It resumed at 9:37 as an air threat conference call, which
lasted more than eight hours. The President,Vice President,
Secretary of Defense, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
all participated in this teleconference at various times,
as did military personnel from the White House underground
shelter and the Presidents military aide on Air Force
One.
Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA, but they had
equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers.
NORAD asked three times before 10:03 to confirm the presence
of the FAA in the teleconference. The FAA representative who
finally joined the call at 10:17 had no familiarity with or
responsibility for hijackings, no access to decisionmakers,
and none of the information available to senior FAA officials.
We found no evidence that, at this critical time, NORADs
top commanders, in Florida or Cheyenne Mountain, coordinated
with their counterparts at FAA headquarters to improve awareness
and organize a common response. Lower-level officials improvisedfor
example, the FAAs Boston Center bypassed the chain of
command and directly contacted NEADS after the first hijacking.
But the highest-level Defense Department officials relied
on the NMCCs air threat conference, in which the FAA
did not participate for the first 48 minutes.
At 9:39, the NMCCs deputy director for operations, a
military officer, opened the call from the Pentagon, which
had just been hit. He began: An air attack against North
America may be in progress. NORAD, whats the situation?
NORAD said it had conflicting reports. Its latest information
was of a possible hijacked aircraft taking off out of
JFK en route to Washington D.C. The NMCC reported a
crash into the mall side of the Pentagon and requested that
the Secretary of Defense be added to the conference.
At 9:44, NORAD briefed the conference on the possible hijacking
of Delta 1989. Two minutes later, staff reported that they
were still trying to locate Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman
Myers. The Vice Chairman joined the conference shortly before
10:00; the Secretary, shortly before 10:30. The Chairman
was out of the country.
At 9:48, a representative from the White House shelter asked
if there were any indications of another hijacked aircraft.
The deputy director for operations mentioned the Delta flight
and concluded that that would be the fourth possible
hijack.
At 9:49, the commander of NORAD directed all air sovereignty
aircraft to battle stations, fully armed.
At 9:59, an Air Force lieutenant colonel working in the White
House Military Office joined the conference and stated he
had just talked to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen
Hadley. The White House requested (1) the implementation of
continuity of government measures, (2) fighter escorts for
Air Force One, and (3) a fighter combat air patrol over Washington,
D.C.
By 10:03, when United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, there had
been no mention of its hijacking and the FAA had not yet been
added to the teleconference.
The President and the Vice President
The President was seated in a classroom when, at 9:05, Andrew
Card whispered to him: A second plane hit the second
tower. America is under attack. The President told us
his instinct was to project calm, not to have the country
see an excited reaction at a moment of crisis. The press was
standing behind the children; he saw their phones and pagers
start to ring. The President felt he should project strength
and calm until he could better understand what was happening.
The President remained in the classroom for another five to
seven minutes, while the children continued reading. He then
returned to a holding room shortly before 9:15, where he was
briefed by staff and saw television coverage. He next spoke
to Vice President Cheney, Dr.Rice, New York Governor George
Pataki, and FBI Director Robert Mueller. He decided to make
a brief statement from the school before leaving for the airport.
The Secret Service told us they were anxious to move the President
to a safer location, but did not think it imperative for him
to run out the door.
Between 9:15 and 9:30, the staff was busy arranging a return
to Washington, while the President consulted his senior advisers
about his remarks. No one in the traveling party had any information
during this time that other aircraft were hijacked or missing.
Staff was in contact with the White House Situation Room,
but as far as we could determine, no one with the President
was in contact with the Pentagon. The focus was on the Presidents
statement to the nation. The only decision made during this
time was to return to Washington.
The Presidents motorcade departed at 9:35, and arrived
at the airport between 9:42 and 9:45. During the ride the
President learned about the attack on the Pentagon. He boarded
the aircraft, asked the Secret Service about the safety of
his family, and called the Vice President. According to notes
of the call, at about 9:45 the President told the Vice President:
Sounds like we have a minor war going on here, I heard
about the Pentagon. Were at war . . . somebodys
going to pay.
About this time, Card, the lead Secret Service agent, the
Presidents military aide, and the pilot were conferring
on a possible destination for Air Force One. The Secret Service
agent felt strongly that the situation in Washington was too
unstable for the President to return there, and Card agreed.
The President
strongly wanted to return to Washington and only grudgingly
agreed to go elsewhere. The issue was still undecided when
the President conferred with the Vice President at about the
time Air Force One was taking off. The Vice President recalled
urging the President not to return to Washington. Air Force
One
departed at about 9:54 without any fixed destination.The objective
was to get up in the airas fast and as high as possibleand
then decide where to go.
At 9:33, the tower supervisor at Reagan National Airport picked
up a hotline to the Secret Service and told the Services
operations center that an aircraft [is] coming at you
and not talking with us. This was the first
specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to
the White House. No move was made to evacuate the Vice President
at this time. As the officer who took the call explained,
[I was] about to push the alert button when the tower
advised that the aircraft was turning south and approaching
Reagan National Airport.
American 77 began turning south, away from the White House,
at 9:34. It continued heading south for roughly a minute,
before turning west and beginning to circle back. This news
prompted the Secret Service to order the immediate evacuation
of the Vice President just before 9:36. Agents propelled him
out of his chair and told him he had to get to the bunker.
The Vice President entered the underground tunnel leading
to the shelter at 9:37.
Once inside,Vice President Cheney and the agents paused in
an area of the tunnel that had a secure phone, a bench, and
television. The Vice President asked to speak to the President,
but it took time for the call to be connected. He learned
in the tunnel that the Pentagon had been hit, and he saw television
coverage of smoke coming from the building.
The Secret Service logged Mrs.Cheneys arrival at the
White House at 9:52, and she joined her husband in the tunnel.
According to contemporaneous notes, at 9:55 the Vice President
was still on the phone with the President advising that three
planes were missing and one had hit the Pentagon. We believe
this is the same call in which the Vice President urged the
President not to return to Washington. After the call ended,
Mrs. Cheney and the Vice President moved from the tunnel to
the shelter conference room.
United 93 and the Shootdown Order
On the morning of 9/11, the President and Vice President stayed
in contact not by an open line of communication but through
a series of calls. The President told us he was frustrated
with the poor communications that morning. He could not reach
key officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, for a period
of time. The line to the White House shelter conference roomand
the Vice Presidentkept cutting off.
The Vice President remembered placing a call to the President
just after entering the shelter conference room. There is
conflicting evidence about when the Vice President arrived
in the shelter conference room. We have concluded, from the
available evidence, that the Vice President arrived in the
room shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58. The Vice President
recalled being told, just after his arrival, that the Air
Force was trying to establish a combat air patrol over Washington.
The Vice President stated that he called the President to
discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. He recalled feeling
that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots
had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot
if the plane would not divert. He said the President signed
off on that concept. The President said he remembered such
a conversation, and that it reminded him of when he had been
an interceptor pilot. The President emphasized to us that
he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft.
The Vice Presidents military aide told us he believed
the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering
the conference room, but he did not hear what they said. Rice,
who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and
sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President,
Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, theyre going to want
to know what to do. Then she recalled hearing him say,
Yes sir. She believed this conversation occurred
a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference
room.
We believe this call would have taken place sometime before
10:10 to 10:15. Among the sources that reflect other important
events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for
this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete. Others
nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice Presidents
chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs.
Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice
President immediately after the Vice President entered the
conference room.
At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving
reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraftpresumably
hijackedheading toward Washington. That aircraft was
United 93. The Secret Service was getting this information
directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the
progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected
path to Washington, not its actual radar return. Thus, the
Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware
the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.
At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told
the Vice President and others that the aircraft was 80 miles
out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage
the aircraft. His reaction was described by Scooter Libby
as quick and decisive, in about the time it takes a
batter to decide to swing. The Vice President authorized
fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us he
based this authorization on his earlier conversation with
the President. The military aide returned a few minutes later,
probably between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was
60 miles out. He again asked for authorization to engage.
The Vice President again said yes.
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief
of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and,
after what he called a quiet moment,suggested
that the Vice President get in touch with the President and
confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make
sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed
the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on
the subject with the President.
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18
for a two-minute conversation that obtained the confirmation.
On Air Force One, the Presidents press secretary was
taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President
told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if
necessary.
Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania.
Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot
down pursuant to this authorization.
At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports
of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out.
Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President
again communicated the authorization to engage or take
out the aircraft. At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat
conference call: I need to get word to Dick Myers that
our reports are theres an inbound aircraft flying low
5 miles out. The Vice Presidents guidance was we need
to take them out.
Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate
of the inbound aircraft. In the apt description of one witness,
It drops below the radar screen and its just continually
hovering in your imagination; you dont know where it
is or what happens to it. Eventually, the shelter received
word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac
helicopter.
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House
to the Pilots
The NMCC learned of United 93s hijacking at about 10:03.
At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the
level of national command. The NMCC learned about United 93
from the White House. It, in turn, was informed by the Secret
Services contacts with the FAA.
NORAD had no information either.At 10:07, its representative
on the air threat conference call stated that NORAD had no
indication of a hijack heading to DC at this time.
Repeatedly between 10:14 and 10:19, a lieutenant colonel at
the White House relayed to the NMCC that the Vice President
had confirmed fighters were cleared to engage inbound aircraft
if they could verify that the aircraft was hijacked.
The commander of NORAD, General Ralph Eberhart,was en route
to the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado,
when the shootdown order was communicated on the air threat
conference call. He told us that by the time he arrived, the
order had already been passed down NORADs chain of command.
It is not clear how the shootdown order was communicated within
NORAD. But we know that at 10:31, General Larry Arnold instructed
his staff to broadcast the following over a NORAD instant
messaging system: 10:31 Vice president has cleared to
us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if
they do not respond per [General Arnold].
In upstate New York, NEADS personnel first learned of the
shootdown order from this message:
Floor Leadership: You need to read this. . . .The Region Commander
has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond
to our direction. Copy that?
Controllers: Copy that, sir.
Floor Leadership: So if youre trying to divert somebody
and he wont divert
Controllers: DO [Director of Operations] is saying no.
Floor Leadership: No? It came over the chat. . . .You got
a conflict on that direction?
Controllers: Right now no, but
Floor Leadership: Okay? Okay, you read that from the Vice
President, right? Vice President has cleared. Vice President
has cleared us to intercept traffic and shoot them down if
they do not respond per
[General Arnold].
In interviews with us, NEADS personnel expressed considerable
confusion over the nature and effect of the order.
The NEADS commander told us he did not pass along the order
because he was unaware of its ramifications. Both the mission
commander and the senior weapons director indicated they did
not pass the order to the fighters circling Washington and
New York because they were unsure how the pilots would, or
should, proceed with this guidance. In short, while leaders
in Washington believed that the fighters above them had been
instructed to take out hostile aircraft, the only
orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to ID type
and tail.
In most cases, the chain of command authorizing the use of
force runs from the president to the secretary of defense
and from the secretary to the combatant commander. The President
apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld for the first time
that morning shortly after 10:00. No one can recall the content
of this conversation, but it was a brief call in which the
subject of shootdown authority was not discussed.
At 10:39, the Vice President updated the Secretary on the
air threat conference:
Vice President: Theres been at least three instances
here where weve had reports of aircraft approaching
Washingtona couple were confirmed hijack. And, pursuant
to the Presidents instructions I gave authorization
for them to be taken out. Hello?
SecDef: Yes, I understand.Who did you give that direction
to?
Vice President: It was passed from here through the [operations]
center at the White House, from the [shelter].
SecDef: OK, let me ask the question here. Has that directive
been transmitted to the aircraft?
Vice President: Yes, it has.
SecDef: So weve got a couple of aircraft up there that
have those instructions at this present time?
Vice President: That is correct. And its my understanding
theyve already taken a couple of aircraft out.
SecDef: We cant confirm that. Were told that one
aircraft is down but we do not have a pilot report that did
it.
As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not in the
NMCC when the shootdown order was first conveyed. He went
from the parking lot to his office (where he spoke to the
President), then to the Executive Support Center, where he
participated in the White House video teleconference. He moved
to the NMCC shortly before 10:30, in order to join Vice Chairman
Myers. Secretary Rumsfeld told us he was just gaining situational
awareness when he spoke with the Vice President at 10:39.
His primary concern was ensuring that the pilots had a clear
understanding of their rules of engagement.
The Vice President was mistaken in his belief that shootdown
authorization had been passed to the pilots flying at NORADs
direction. By 10:45 there was, however, another set of fighters
circling Washington that had entirely different rules of engagement.
These fighters, part of the 113th Wing of the District of
Columbia Air National Guard, launched out of Andrews Air Force
Base in Maryland in response to information passed to them
by the Secret Service. The first of the Andrews fighters was
airborne at 10:38.
General David Wherleythe commander of the 113th Wingreached
out to the Secret Service after hearing secondhand reports
that it wanted fighters airborne. A Secret Service agent had
a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other
to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions
that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice
President. The guidance for Wherley was to send up the aircraft,
with orders to protect the White House and take out any aircraft
that threatened the Capitol. General Wherley translated this
in military terms to flying weapons freethat
is, the decision to shoot rests in the cockpit, or in this
case in the cockpit of the lead pilot. He passed these instructions
to the pilots that launched at 10:42 and afterward.
Thus, while the fighter pilots under NORAD direction who had
scrambled out of Langley never received any type of engagement
order, the Andrews pilots were operating weapons freea
permissive rule of engagement. The President and the Vice
President indicated to us they had not been aware that fighters
had been scrambled out of Andrews, at the request of the Secret
Service and outside the military chain of command. There is
no evidence that NORAD headquarters or military officials
in the NMCC knewduring the morning of September 11that
the Andrews planes were airborne and operating
under different rules of engagement.
What If?
NORAD officials have maintained consistently that had the
passengers not caused United 93 to crash, the military would
have prevented it from reaching Washington, D.C. That conclusion
is based on a version of events that we now know is incorrect.
The Langley fighters were not scrambled in response to United
93; NORAD did not have 47 minutes to intercept the flight;
NORAD did not even know the plane was hijacked until after
it had crashed. It is appropriate, therefore, to reconsider
whether United 93 would have been intercepted.
Had it not crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03, we estimate that
United 93 could not have reached Washington any earlier than
10:13, and probably would have arrived before 10:23. There
was only one set of fighters circling Washington during that
time framethe Langley F-16s. They were armed and under
NORADs control. After NEADS learned of the hijacking
at 10:07, NORAD would have had from 6 to 16 minutes to locate
the flight, receive authorization to shoot it down, and communicate
the order to the pilots, who (in the
same span) would have had to authenticate the order, intercept
the flight, and execute the order.
At that point in time, the Langley pilots did not know the
threat they were facing, did not know where United 93 was
located, and did not have shootdown authorization.
First, the Langley pilots were never briefed about the reason
they were scrambled. As the lead pilot explained, I
reverted to the Russian threat. . . . Im thinking cruise
missile threat from the sea. You know you look down and see
the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastards snuck one
by us. . . . [Y]ou
couldnt see any airplanes, and no one told us anything.
The pilots knew their mission was to divert aircraft, but
did not know that the threat came from hijacked airliners.
Second, NEADS did not have accurate information on the location
of United 93. Presumably FAA would have provided such information,
but we do not know how long that would have taken, nor how
long it would have taken NEADS to locate the target.
Third, NEADS needed orders to pass to the pilots. At 10:10,
the pilots over Washington were emphatically told, negative
clearance to shoot. Shootdown authority was first communicated
to NEADS at 10:31. It is possible that NORAD commanders would
have ordered a shootdown in the absence of the authorization
communicated by the Vice President, but given the gravity
of the decision to shoot down a commercial airliner, and NORADs
caution that a mistake not be made, we view this possibility
as unlikely.
NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted
and shot down United 93. We are not so sure. We are sure that
the nation owes a debt to the passengers of United 93. Their
actions saved the lives of countless others, and may have
saved either the Capitol or the White House from destruction.
The details of what happened on the morning of September 11
are complex, but they play out a simple theme. NORAD and the
FAA were unprepared for the type of attacks launched against
the United States on September 11, 2001. They struggled, under
difficult circumstances, to improvise a homeland defense against
an unprecedented challenge they had never before encountered
and had never trained to meet.
At 10:02 that morning, an assistant to the mission crew commander
at NORADs Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome, New
York, was working with his colleagues on the floor of the
command center. In a brief moment of reflection, he was recorded
remarking that This is a new type of war.
He was, and is, right. But the conflict did not begin on 9/11.
It had been publicly declared years earlier, most notably
in a declaration faxed early in 1998 to an Arabic-language
newspaper in London. Few Americans had noticed it. The fax
had been sent from thousands of miles away by the followers
of a Saudi
exile gathered in one of the most remote and impoverished
countries on earth.