The 9/11 Commission
Report
From Chapter
1, sections 1.1 and 1.2
These sections of chapter one
detail the hijacking of United Airlines Flight 175 as it
left Logan Airport in Boston for Los Angeles until it crashed
into the South Tower of The World Trade Center at 9:03 AM,
and the homeland defense reaction to the hijacking. [note:
where possible, recordings of the actual aircraft/air traffic
control transmissions have been inserted in the appropriate
places]
From Chapter 1, Section
1:
The Hijacking of United 175
United Airlines Flight 175 was scheduled to depart for Los
Angeles at 8:00. Captain Victor Saracini and First Officer
Michael Horrocks piloted the Boeing 767, which had seven
flight attendants. Fifty-six passengers boarded the flight.
United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed
Logan Airport at 8:14. By 8:33, it had reached its assigned
cruising altitude of 31,000 feet. The flight attendants
would have begun their cabin service.
The flight had taken off just as American 11 was being hijacked,
and at 8:42 the United 175 flight crew completed their report
on a suspicious transmission overheard from
another plane (which turned out to have been Flight 11)
just after takeoff. This was United 175s last communication
with the ground.
The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46. They
used knives (as reported by two passengers and a flight
attendant), Mace (reported by one passenger), and the threat
of a bomb (reported by the same passenger). They stabbed
members of the flight crew (reported by a flight attendant
and one passenger).
Both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight attendant).
The eyewitness accounts came from calls made from the rear
of the plane, from passengers originally seated further
forward in the cabin, a sign that passengers and perhaps
crew had been moved to the back of the aircraft. Given similarities
to American 11 in hijacker seating and in eyewitness reports
of tactics and weapons, as well as the contact between the
presumed team leaders, Atta and Shehhi, we believe the tactics
were similar on both flights.
The first operational evidence that something was abnormal
on United 175 came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon
codes twice within a minute. At 8:51, the flight deviated
from its assigned altitude, and a minute later New York
air traffic controllers began repeatedly and unsuccessfully
trying to contact it.
At 8:52, in Easton, Connecticut, a man named Lee Hanson
received a phone call from his son Peter, a passenger on
United 175. His son told him: I think theyve
taken over the cockpitAn attendant has been stabbedand
someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is
making strange moves. Call United AirlinesTell them
its Flight 175, Boston to LA. Lee Hanson then
called the Easton Police Department and relayed what he
had heard.
Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant called a United office
in San Francisco, reaching Marc Policastro. The flight attendant
reported that the flight had been hijacked, both pilots
had been killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and
the hijackers were probably flying the plane. The call lasted
about two minutes, after which Policastro and a colleague
tried unsuccessfully to contact the flight.
At 8:58, the flight took a heading toward New York City.
At 8:59, Flight 175 passenger Brian David Sweeney tried
to call his wife, Julie. He left a message on their home
answering machine that the plane had been hijacked. He then
called his mother, Louise Sweeney, told her the flight had
been hijacked, and added that the passengers were thinking
about storming the cockpit to take control of the plane
away from the hijackers.
At 9:00, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son
Peter:
Its getting bad, DadA stewardess was stabbedThey
seem to have knives and MaceThey said they have a
bombIts getting very bad on the planePassengers
are throwing up and getting sickThe plane is making
jerky movementsI dont think the pilot is flying
the planeI think we are going downI think they
intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a buildingDont
worry, DadIf it happens, itll be very fastMy
God, my God.
The call ended abruptly. Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream
just before it cut off. He turned on a television, and in
her home so did Louise Sweeney. Both then saw the second
aircraft hit the World Trade Center.
At 9:03:11, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South
Tower of the World Trade Center. All on board, along with
an unknown number of people in the tower,were killed instantly.
From Chapter 1, Section
2:
United Airlines Flight 175
FAA Awareness. One of the last transmissions from United
Airlines Flight 175 is, in retrospect, chilling. By 8:40,
controllers at the FAAs New York Center were seeking
information on American 11. At approximately 8:42, shortly
after entering New York Centers airspace, the pilot
of United 175 broke in
with the following transmission:
UAL 175: New York UAL 175 heavy.
FAA: UAL 175 go ahead.
UAL 175: Yeah. We figured wed wait to go to your center.
Ah, we heard a suspicious transmission on our departure
out of Boston, ah, with someone, ah, it sounded like someone
keyed the mikes and said ah
everyone ah stay in your seats.
FAA: Oh, okay. Ill pass that along over here.
Minutes later, United 175 turned southwest without clearance
from air traffic control. At 8:47, seconds after the impact
of American 11, United 175s transponder code changed,
and then changed again. These shanges were not noticed for
several minutes, however, because the same New York Center
controller was assigned to both American 11 and United 175.
The controller knew American 11 was hijacked; he was focused
on searching for it after the aircraft disappeared at 8:46.
At 8:48, while the controller was still trying to locate
American 11, a New York Center manager provided the following
report on a Command Center teleconference about American
11:
Manager, New York Center: Okay. This is New York Center.
Were watching the airplane. I also had conversation
with American Airlines, and theyve told us that they
believe that one of their stewardesses
was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit that
have control of the aircraft, and thats all the information
they have right now.
The New York Center controller and manager were unaware
that American 11 had already crashed.
At 8:51, the controller noticed the transponder change from
United 175 and tried to contact the aircraft. There was
no response. Beginning at 8:52, the controller made repeated
attempts to reach the crew of United 175. Still no response.
The controller checked his radio equipment and contacted
another controller at 8:53, saying that we may have
a hijack and that he could not find the aircraft.
Another commercial aircraft in the vicinity then radioed
in with reports over the radio of a commuter plane
hitting the World Trade Center. The controller spent
the next several minutes handing off the other flights on
his scope to other controllers and moving aircraft out of
the way of the unidentified aircraft (believed to be United
175) as it moved southwest and then turned northeast toward
New York City.
At about 8:55, the controller in charge notified a New York
Center manager that she believed United 175 had also been
hijacked. The manager tried to notify the regional managers
and was told that they were discussing a hijacked aircraft
(presumably American 11) and refused to be disturbed. At
8:58, the New York Center controller searching for United
175 told another New York controller we might have
a hijack over here, two of them.
Between 9:01 and 9:02, a manager from New York Center told
the Command Center in Herndon:
Manager, New York Center: We have several situations going
on here. Its escalating big, big time. We need to
get the military involved with us. . . .Were, were
involved with something else, we have other aircraft that
may have a similar situation going on here.
The other aircraft referred to by New York Center
was United 175. Evidence indicates that this conversation
was the only notice received by either FAA headquarters
or the Herndon Command Center prior to the second crash
that there had been a second hijacking.
While the Command Center was told about this other
aircraft at 9:01, New York Center contacted New York
terminal approach control and asked for help in locating
United 175.
Terminal: I got somebody who keeps coasting but it looks
like hes going into one of the small airports down
there.
Center: Hold on a second. Im trying to bring him up
here and get youThere he is right there. Hold on.
Terminal: Got him just out of 9,5009,000 now.
Center: Do you know who he is?
Terminal: Were just, we just we dont know who
he is.Were just picking him up now.
Center (at 9:02): Alright. Heads up man, it looks like another
one coming in.
The controllers observed the plane in a rapid descent; the
radar data terminated over Lower Manhattan. At 9:03, United
175 crashed into the South Tower.
Meanwhile, a manager from Boston Center reported that they
had deciphered what they had heard in one of the first hijacker
transmissions from American 11:
Boston Center: Hey . . . you still there?
New England Region: Yes, I am.
Boston Center: . . . as far as the tape, Bobby seemed to
think the guy said that we have planes. Now,
I dont know if it was because it was the accent, or
if theres more than one, but Im gonna, Im
gonna
reconfirm that for you, and Ill get back to you real
quick. Okay?
New England Region: Appreciate it.
Unidentified Female Voice: They have what?
Boston Center: Planes, as in plural.
Boston Center: It sounds like, were talking to New
York, that theres another one aimed at the World Trade
Center.
New England Region: Theres another aircraft?
Boston Center: A second one just hit the Trade Center.
New England Region: Okay.Yeah, we gotta getwe gotta
alert the military real quick on this.
Boston Center immediately advised the New England Region
that it was going to stop all departures at airports under
its control. At 9:05, Boston Center confirmed for both the
FAA Command Center and the New England Region that the hijackers
aboard American 11 said we have planes. At the
same time, New York Center declared ATC zeromeaning
that aircraft were not permitted to depart from, arrive
at, or travel through New York Centers airspace until
further notice.
Within minutes of the second impact, Boston Center instructed
its controllers to inform all aircraft in its airspace of
the events in New York and to advise aircraft to heighten
cockpit security. Boston Center asked the Herndon Command
Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide.We
have found no evidence to suggest that the Command Center
acted on this request or issued any type of cockpit security
alert.
Military Notification and Response. The first indication
that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked
aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York
Center to NEADS at 9:03. The notice came at about the time
the plane was hitting the South Tower.
By 9:08, the mission crew commander at NEADS learned of
the second explosion at the World Trade Center and decided
against holding the fighters in military airspace away from
Manhattan:
Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: This is what I foresee that
we probably need to do. We need to talk to FAA. We need
to tell em if this stuff is gonna keep on going, we
need to take those fighters, putem over Manhattan.
Thats best thing, thats the best play right
now. So coordinate with the FAA. Tell em if theres
more out there, which we dont know, lets get
em over Manhattan. At least we got some kind
of play.
The FAA cleared the airspace. Radar data show that at 9:13,
when the Otis fighters were about 115 miles away from the
city, the fighters exited their holding pattern and set
a course direct for Manhattan. They arrived at 9:25 and
established a combat air patrol (CAP) over the city.
Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel
in flying first to military airspace and then to New York,
the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. NEADS
considered scrambling alert fighters from Langley Air Force
Base in Virginia to New York, to provide backup. The Langley
fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09. NORAD had
no indication that any other plane had been hijacked.